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How (Not) to Reform the Law of Rape
A. THE PROBLEM
In Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of2001 ),1 a bench of seven judges of the High Court of
Justiciary has held (with two judges dissenting) that the actus reus of rape "is constituted by
the man having sexual intercourse with the woman without her consent",2 and that force—or
the threat of force—is not a necessary element of the actus reus.
The problem arose in the following way. In a trial for rape, the trial judge withdrew the
charge from the jury on the basis that the Crown had not led sufficient evidence to prove that
force, or the threat of force, had been used to overcome the will of the complainer. Following
the decision, and the resultant media outcry, the Lord Advocate presented a petition to the
High Court1 for a ruling on whether force was a necessary element of the actus reus of rape.
The decision of the High Court focused principally on two authorities. The first of these
was the 1858 decision in Charles Sweenie* where a majority of the court had held that for a
man to have intercourse with a sleeping woman was not rape, because this did not involve
using force to overcome the eomplainer's will. It was, however, a separate crime, now referred
to as "clandestine injury". The second was the earlier 1847 decision in William Fraser,5 where
a majority of the court held that for a man to have intercourse with a woman by impersonating
her husband was not rape.6 The judges in the majority in that case adopted different reasons
for their decision—some holding that this was not rape because no force (or some equivalent,
such as drugging) had been used, some because fraud as to identity did not vitiate consent,
but a majority of the court took the view that it was sufficient for the actus reus of rape that
the man had sexual intercourse with the complainer without her consent.
Those views were obiter, and did not bind the court in Sweenie (indeed, it is not clear that
the Sweenie court appreciated their significance), and the decision in Sweenie remained
binding. The question for the Reference court, therefore, was whether the decision in Sweenie
could—and should—be overruled. By a majority of five votes to two, both of these questions
were answered in the affirmative.
In the remainder of this article, the following propositions are advanced. First, the
rationale(s) offered by the Reference majority for overruling Sweenie is weak and unconvincing.
Second, a better justification for overruling Sweenie can be found by examining—and
rebutting—the arguments presented in the dissenting judgments. Third, the Reference decision
illustrates the inappropriateness of the court undertaking what is effectively a law reform
project, a matter which should properly be the province of the Scottish Parliament. As a
preliminary point, however, it is necessary to consider a basic issue of competence—was it
actually open to the Reference court to consider overruling Sweenie?
B. THE DECISION
(1) Crossing the threshold: could the court overrule Sweenie?
It is accepted that a bench of the High Court may overrule decisions taken by a bench con-
sisting of fewer judges.7 It appears that it is for that reason that a bench of seven judges—one
1 Lord Advocate's Reference (No 1 of2001) 2002 SLT 466 (henceforth Reference).
2 Reference, per Lord Justice-General Cullen at 476.
3 Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995, s 123.
4 (1858)3Irvl09.
5 (1847) Ark 280.
6 The decision itself was subsequently overruled by statute: Criminal Law Amendment Act 188.5, s 4. See
now Criminal Law (Consolidation) (Scotland) Act 1995, s 7(3).
7 See The Laws ofScotland: Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia (henceforth SME), vol 22 (1987), para 310.
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more than sat in Sweenie—was convened for the Reference. Sweenie, was, however, arguably
a decision of the Whole Court—save for the fact that the office of Lord Justice-Clerk was
vacant at the time of the decision due to the death of Lord Hope. That raised the issue of
whether decisions of the Whole Court can only be overruled by another Whole Court (if they
can be overruled at all), a question which was raised but not decided in the case of Sugden v
HM Advocate.'' The majority sidestep this issue, arguing that Sweenie should not be regarded
as a decision of the Whole Court given the absence of the _Lord Justice-Clerk.9 Lord
McCluskey, however, argues that Sweenie should be regarded as a Whole Court decision,
and that it cannot therefore be overruled "without introducing a new doctrine, not yet
recognised in our law, that a long-standing decision of the Whole Court of the High Court of
Justiciary can be overruled by a court of seven judges".10
Lord McCluskey does not discuss the issue any further than this, and the remainder of
the court avoids it altogether. It may be, as is suggested in the Stair Memorial Encyclopaedia,
that the issue is of "little or no practical importance" given the small number ofWhole Court
decisions and the number of them which might call for future reconsideration.11 In those
circumstances, I shall do no more than make the following three observations:
First, Lord McCluskey argues that the fact that the office of Lord Justice-Clerk was vacant
when Sweenie was decided does not affect its status as a decision of the Whole Court, observing
that the Whole Court has on occasion sat without all the judges being present.12 While that is
correct, it may be that Whole Court decisions which were taken in the absence of one or
more judges fall to be treated differently as far as the law of binding precedent is concerned.
Second, because there is no High Court decision on the binding effect of Whole Courtjudgments, it is submitted that it is open to any court sitting with more judges than a relevant
Whole Court to decide that it is not bound by a prior decision of that court.13 The Reference
court could, therefore, have decided this point if it had felt it necessary, not being bound by
any prior decision on the point.14
Third, it is all but inconceivable that a Whole Court could be convened today due to the
present number of High Court judges. Effectively, to hold that a Whole Court decision can
only be overruled by another Whole Court (if at all) would render Whole Court decisions
unreviewable, save by legislation. However, it appears to be accepted in both Scotland and
England that any doctrine of non-reviewable binding precedent is undesirable. Hence, for
example, the 1966 Practice Statement,15 allowing the House of Lords to depart from its own
previous decisions, and s 2 of the Human Rights Act 1998, which provides that UK courts
must "take into account" decisions of the ECHR organs, but are not bound by such decisions.16
8 1934 JC 103.
9 Reference, per Lord Justice-General Cullen at 475.
10 Reference, per Lord McCluskey at 490. Lord Marnoeh reserved his opinion on this point: Reference, at 478.
11 SME, vol 22, para 309.
12 Reference, per Lord McCluskey at 490, citing Sugden v HM Advocate 1934 JC 103 and Kirkwood v HMAdvocate 1939 JC 36. It is, incidentally, therefore unclear how a decision qualifies as a "Whole Court"
decision if it does not require the participation of all the judges. Does its status as such depend upon the
participation of a minimum numher of judges? But if that is the case, and six judges constituted a Whole
Court in Sweenie, should not the seven Reference judges constitute a Whole Court?
13 Cf, however, SME, vol 22, para 309, where it seems to be assumed that it would be necessary to convene aWhole Court to "decide on the power to review a Whole Court decision".
14 It should not be assumed that a "lower" court is not entitled to decide that it is not bound by the decisions
of a "higher" court. See Farrell v Farrell 1990 SCLR 717 (Sh Ct) (sheriffnot bound by decision of an Outer
House judge). Of course, one might argue that a sheriff should not automatically be regarded as "beneath"
an Outer House judge, but equally, a court of seven judges should not automatically be regarded as "beneath"
a Whole Court with fewer members.
15 Practice Statement (Judicial Precedent) [1966] 1 WLR 1234.
16 The European Court of Human Rights can, of course, review its own prior decisions. But there is no
appeal from the UK courts to the European Court, and, if the relevant issue is decided against the interests
of the State in the domestic courts, no method by which the State can ask the European Court to consider
the issue.
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IfWhole Court decisions were held to be unreviewable, this would give a unique status to a
very small number of relatively archaic (which is not, necessarily, to say incorrect) decisions.
That would seem anomalous, and prima facie, undesirable—especially given that many of
these decisions would have been taken at a point when the doctrine of stare decisis was not
firmly established in Scots law.17
(2) The majority rationale
The general rationale of the majority decision is found in Lord Cullen's opinion, in which all
of the other four judges in the majority concurred. It is not clear, however, precisely what
that rationale is. Lord Cullen appears to advance two different bases for holding that force is
not an element of the actus reus of rape.
The first of these bases is that Sweenie was simply wrongly decided. This conclusion is
supported by four different propositions, as follows. First, despite Sweenie, it is clear that
force was never required where the victim was legally incapable of giving consent (as in the
case of a child under twelve or a mentally incapable woman). Second, in decisions subsequent
to Sweenie, "the concept of'force' was artificially extended to cases in which the accused had
used no actual force but had used some means of putting the woman in a state in which she
was incapable of resisting". Third, the degree of force (and resistance) required depended "on
the situation of the woman". Fourth, inJamieson v HM Advocate,18 the court had "defined the
mens rea of rape by reference to the accused's belief that the woman consented".19
"These considerations", states Lord Cullen, "strongly suggest to me that Sweenie was
wrongly decided."20 It is not easy to understand this conclusion. Given that the second and
fourth considerations both post-date Sweenie, they are hardly grounds for suggesting that
Sweenie itself was wrongly decided. Indeed, it might be argued that they are themselves
incorrect given Sweenie. The third consideration is predicated on the existence of a force
requirement, and cannot, therefore, be prayed in aid ofan argument that no such requirement
exists. (It might be a basis for an argument about the practicality of applying a force require-
ment, but that is not the point which Lord Cullen is making.) The first consideration is the
most important, but hardly conclusive—there is nothing illogical, contradictory or unworkable
about a rule which holds that force is generally required but that an exception is made for
certain categories of victim. (Indeed, Lord Cullen goes on to employ exactly this sort of
reasoning, holding that underage and incapable victims are an exception to the general rule
that sexual intercourse with consent is not rape.)21
It is probably in recognition of the weakness of these arguments that Lord Cullen goes on
to invoke "wider considerations", which provide the second possible basis for the Reference
decision. Arguing that the current law may not be "in accordance with a modern view of the
rights ofwomen, their relationship to men and their place in society", he concludes that "the
law of rape [should] support the principle that whether there is to be sexual intercourse
should depend on whether the woman consents, wherever and w henever she pleases".22
This proposition is (or at least, should be) uncontroversial, but its invocation is disingenuous.
First, the court produces no evidence to support the proposition that the decision in Sweenie
was based upon an outdated view of the place ofwomen in society, as opposed to the court's
17 On the development ofstare decisis, see generally J C Gardner, Judicial Precedent in Scots Law (1936), ch
3i T B Smith, The Doctrines ofJudicial Precedent in Scots Law (1952), ch 2.
18 1994 JC 88.
19 Reference, at 473--174.
20 Reference, at 474.
21 Reference, at 476. This is achieved through a rule that the absence of consent will be irrebuttably presumed
where the complainer is underage or incapable. But that is a legal fiction, and if we are going to employlegal fictions here, we could just as easily employ an irrebuttable presumption that intercourse with an
underage or incapable victim is forcible.
22 Reference, at 475; see also Lady Cosgrove at 481.
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desire to construe narrowly what was then a capital offence.23 Second, the criminal law already
supports the principle invoked by Lord Cullen, for sexual intercourse without consent is
indecent assault, which carries the same maximum penalty as rape. Indeed, Lord Cullen is
adamant elsewhere in his judgment that the change wrought by the majority "[does] not
involve rendering unlawful what is at present lawful".24 (If that were not the case, the change
wrought by the majority could perhaps have been justified by invoking art 3 of the European
Convention on Human Rights.)25 If the outcome of the Reference is to be justified on the
basis of such "wider considerations", this cannot be on the basis that these dictate that non-
consensual but non-forcible sexual intercourse should be a criminal offence (for it already is),
but on the basis that it must attract the label "rape" rather than "indecent assault". That is a
more difficult argument to make, and neither Lord Cullen nor any other member of the
Reference bench attempts it.
Perhaps most importantly, it is clear that the Reference majority is happy to accept that
the court has a proper role as an engine of law reform. To quote Lord Cullen: "a live system
of law should take account of contemporary attitudes and mores ... a live system of law
should be responsive to changing circumstances".26 It is, of course, true that criminal reform
in Scotland has in recent history been the province of the judiciary rather than the legislature.27
That might, however, have been expected to change in light of the devolution settlement. I
shall return to this point later.
(3) The dissenting opinions
Both Lord McCluskey and Lord Marnoch argue that, even if the court is technically entitled
to overrule Sweenie, it is inappropriate to do so. Their argument (I do not intend to explore
the subtle differences between their positions here) has two stages. First, although the High
Court can overrule a previous decision in order to correct an error, there is nothing erroneous
about Sweenie. It decided nothing new, but simply re-affirmed the understanding of the law
which was clear from Hume's treatment of rape. Second, even if Sweenie had been wrongly
decided, the decision has stood for too long to be open to review by the courts at this stage,
and reform must be a matter for the legislature. I believe that a more plausible rationale for
the Reference decision can be found by rebutting each of these points, in turn.
To address the first point: the minority's interpretation of Hume (which is not expressly
disputed by the majority) can be expressed in two propositions. These are: (a) Hume regarded
force (or the threat of force) as an essential element of the actus reus of rape; and, as a
corollary, (b) sexual intercourse without consent, in the absence of force, was insufficient for
the crime of rape. The thesis which I intend to advance (briefly) here is that this interpretation
of Hume is misconceived. In particular, proposition (b) is not the corollary of proposition (a),
and it is not supported by a careful reading of Hume.
The first point to note is that Hume does occasionally talk of rape in terms of "no consent".
So, for example, after stating that "the knowledge of the woman's person must be against her
will, and bv force",28 he goes on to state:
23 As suggested in HM Advocate v Logan 1936 JC 100 per Lord Justice-Clerk Aitchison at 102.
24 Reference, at 474. See also Lord Nimmo Smith at 482 and Lord McCluskey at 488. Cf Lord Marnoch at 478.
25 It is arguable that non-consensual intercourse is "inhuman or degrading treatment" within the meaning of
art 3 of the ECHR, and that the State is therefore under a positive duty to criminalise the relevant conduct.This, in turn, raises a possible art 7 (non-retrospectivity) problem, but it may be that developments in the
criminal law which are required by the ECHR are "reasonably foreseeable" and thus do not violate art 7.
See A v United Kingdom (1999) 27 EHRR 611; SW v United Kingdom (1996) 21 EHRR 363.
26 Reference, at 475. See also Lady Cosgrove at 481. Cf Lord McCluskey at 490.
27 See C H W Cane, "Criminal law reform in Scotland" (1998) 3 SLPQ101.
28 D Hume, Commentaries on the Law of Scotland, Respecting Crimes, 4th edn by B R Bell (1844), Vol 1,
302. P W Ferguson has suggested that it may be significant that this statement "was repeated in Bell's
edition of the Commentaries published just three years before Fräser". (P W Ferguson, "The definition of
rape", 2002 SLT (News) 163, at 163; see also Reference, per Lord Marnoch at 476.) The Commentaries
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This doctrine must, however, always be understood in a reasonable, and not a captious sense. It is
evidently no consent, to do away the guilt of rape, if the woman only discontinue her resistance out of
fear of death, as when a pistol is clapped to her head .
.
.29
Second, we must note Hume's use of the phrase "discontinue her resistance". For Hume, it
was self-evident that any woman threatened with non-consensual sexual intercourse would
resist the man concerned, meaning that it would be impossible for the man to have intercourse
without the use of force. For Hume, proposition (b) would be a nonsense, because such a
case was simply inconceivable. In taking this stance, Hume was simply reflecting views which
were near-universal amongst lawyers (invariably, of course, male) of his time. To quote the
New York Court of Appeals in 1874:
Can the mind conceive ofa woman, in the possession ofher faculties and powers, revoltingly unwilling
that this deed should be done upon her, who would not resist so hard and so long as she was able?
And if a woman, aware that it will be done unless she does resist, does not resist to the extent of her
ability on the occasion, must it not be that she is not entirely reluctant?3"
The fact that Hume did not see the use of force as essential in itself for the crime of rape, but
simply as an inevitable corollary of non-consensual intercourse where the complainer was an
adult of sound mind and body, is shown by his reference to the case ofJames Mackie™ where
the complainer was "a poor cripple lame lass
. . .
unable to make any resistance". Mackie did
not, therefore, require to use force to overcome the complainer's will,32 but was nevertheless
convicted of rape—a verdict which Hume cites with approval. This also explains why Hume
did not see force as essential in cases where the complainer was unable to give a valid consent
to sexual intercourse due to nonage or mental incapacity.
It was not until the courts—both in England and in Scotland—were confronted with
cases involving intoxicated or sleeping victims in the mid-nineteenth century that the issue of
non-consensual but non-forcible intercourse received any detailed consideration.33 (The
question would also have arisen squarely in Eraser had the court been prepared to hold that
fraud as to identity vitiated consent.) The Sweenie court, I would suggest, was not simply
"applying" Hume's definition of the crime, but was considering a scenario which was not
addressed in Hume's treatment of rape. The decision of the court broke new ground; it did
not simply apply established law. Lord Marnoch is therefore incorrect to say that the dicta in
Fraser "are clearly at odds with every other authority at about that time";34 there is simply no
other authority from that period which addresses the question of sexual intercourse which is
both non-forcible and non-consensual, except forJames Mackie, which is perfectly consistent
first appeared as two separate texts in 1797 and 1800. In the second and third editions (published in 1819
and 1829 respectively), Hume left the text essentially unaltered, but simply added in references to new
cases and statutes by way of notes. (See the "Advertisement" which appears at the start of the third and
fourth editions.) Bell then produced a further edition of the Commentaries in 1844 which were accompanied
by a set of supplemental notes of cases decided from 1828 onwards. He did not edit the text of the
Commentaries itself. In those circumstances, the fact that the statement was "repeated" in Bell's edition is
of no significance whatsoever.
29 Hume, 1, 302.
30 People v Dohring (1874) 59 NY 374 per Folger J at 384.
31 (1650) Hume, 1.303.
32 It is true that Mackie could not have effected penetration without a modicum of force, but nor could have
Sweenie. It is impossible (without violating the laws of physics) for penetration to be effected without the
application of force by one party, but such a degree of force will not serve to satisfy any requirement of
"force" in rape, otherwise such a requirement would be all but redundant.
33 In Scotland, in Sweenie; in England, in R v Camplin (1845) 1 Cox CC 220; R v Mayers (1872) 12 Cox CC
311.
34 Reference, at 477.
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with Fraser. All this, I would suggest, provides a firmer basis for an argument that Sweenie
was wrongly decided than that offered by the Reference majority.
If this is correct, and the proposition that sexual intercourse which is both non-consensual
and non-forcible is not rape has no earlier authority than Sweenie to support it, as I would
argue, the decision of the High Court to overrule Sweenie becomes less problematic than
Lords McCluskey and Marnoch suggest. There is, nevertheless, something problematic about
overturning a judicial decision which has stood for 143 years, and this brings us on to the
second objection of the minority: that the decision in Sweenie has stood for too long to be
open to review by the courts now.
This position is taken most clearly by Lord Marnoch: "in any legal system which recognises
the authority of precedent as bringing continuity and certainty to the common law, there
must surely come a time when settled law must simply be accepted as being the law".35 The
problem with this argument is that there are numerous occasions (as Lord McCluskey
concedes) on which the High Court has taken it upon itself to correct errors in previous
decisions, such as Brennan v HM Advocate36 (abolition of a partial defence of voluntary
intoxication in murder cases) and Galbraith v HM Advocate37 (abolition of the requirement
of "mental illness" as a foundation for the defence of diminished responsibility). Now, none
of the previous decisions concerned had stood for as long as Sweenie, but once one accepts
that a fifty-six-year-old decision38 can be overruled (as in Brennan), it is difficult to see at
what point there might "come a time" when the High Court must concede that an established
decision is no longer open to review. Certainly, the Court of Session does not appear to have
accepted the validity of such a stance, holding in Commerzbank Aktiengesellschaft v Large39
that it could disregard a House of Lords decision which had stood for 153 years.40
C. THE COURT AS A LAW REFORM BODY
(1) A preliminary point: anglicisation, again
In an earlier article in this journal, I observed that the effect of the Full Bench decision in
Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)*1 was to import (without acknowledgment) the English
statutory definition of the doctrine of diminished responsibility into Scots law.42 In the light
of the Reference, it appears that such unacknowledged borrowing is becoming a habit of the
High Court. This can best be illustrated by a juxtaposition of two quotations. The first is from
Lord Cullen's opinion in the Reference:
In my view this court should hold that.
.
.
the general rule is that the actus reus of rape is constituted
by the man having sexual intercourse with the woman without her consent.
. .
[and] mens rea on the
part of the man is present where he knows that the woman is not consenting or at any rate is reckless
as to whether she is consenting.43
35 Reference, at 478. See also Lord McCluskey at 489, but his position differs in that he is not prepared to
concede arguendo that Sweenie might have been wrongly decided.
36 1977 JC 38.
37 2002 JC1.
38 HM Advocate v Campbell 1921 JC 1.
39 1977 SC 375.
40 Hyslops v Gordon (1824) 2 Sh App 451.
41 2002 JC1.
42 J Chalmers, "Abnormality and anglicisation: first thoughts on Galbraith v HM Advocate (No 2)" (2002) 6
EdinLR 108.
43 Reference, at 476. A practice appears to be developing whereby the leading opinion in a Full Bench case
will include a summary of the principal points which have been decided. See Thompson v Crowe 2000 JC
173, per Lord Justice-General Rodger at 202; Galbraith v HM Advocate 2002 JC 1, per Lord Justice-General Rodger at 21-22.
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The second quotation is from the English statutory definition of rape:
...
a man commits rape if—
(a) he has sexual intercourse with a person (whether vaginal or anal) who at the time of the intercourse
does not consent to it; and
(b) at the time he knows that the person does not consent to the intercourse or is reckless as to
whether that person consents to it.44
The similarity between the two definitions (aside from the fact that English law, since 1994,
recognises non-consensual anal intercourse with either a woman or a man as rape) should be
self-evident. In that context, it is instructive to consider another comment made by Lord
(.'ullcn:
The court was invited to consider the formulation of the requirements for the crime of rape which
applv in the law of England and other countries in the British Commonwealth. I have not found this
exercise to be useful or reliable. In this context the historical roots and concepts of another system
cannot be assumed to be similar to those of the law of Scotland. Furthermore, the position in many
other countries has been largely superseded by legislation.41
Whether the anglicisation which I have noted is conscious or not, it makes a nonsense of Lord
Cullen's rationale for declining to consider English material on the definition of rape. If Scotland
is to adopt a definition of the crime of rape which is largely identical to that which applies in
England, might there not be something to be learned from the way in which that definition
has been inteq^reted and applied in that jurisdiction ? If the High Court is to function as a law
reform body (and the majority of the Reference court appears content that it should), it must
take the responsibilities of a law reform body seriously—and that includes appropriate use of
the comparative method.46
(2) Law reform and "wider considerations"
As noted earlier, the Reference majority relies to a certain extent on "wider con-siderations" tojustify overruling Sweenie. These are, indeed, the sort of matters which would normally be
taken into account in any law reform project. But, as Lord McCluskey points out, the court is
ill-equipped to take such matters into account. It cannot hear evidence, or invite submissions
from interested parties.47 The court's treatment of the "wider considerations" to which it refers
is far briefer than would be expected in a law reform exercise, and no opportunity is afforded
to the public to comment on the assumptions and arguments on which the court relies.
It is also unfortunate that the court does not consider the effect of abolishing the crime of
clandestine injury, which is one effect of the Reference decision (as such conduct is now,
necessarily, rape).48 In the recent case of Paton v HM Advocate,49 which is not referred to in
44 Sexual Offences Act 1956, s 1, as substituted bv the Criminal Justice and Public Order Act 1994,
s 142.
45 Reference, at 473.
46 Cf Law Commissions Act 1965, s 3(l)(f), which places a statutory obligation on the Law Commissions "to
obtain such information as to the legal systems of other countries as appears to the Commissioners likely to
facilitate the performance of any of their functions".
47 Reference, at 485. Presumably, however, it would be open to the High Court to make some limited provision
for such submissions by Act of Sederunt. Cf RCS r 58.8A, as inserted by Act of Sederunt (Rules of the
Court of Session Amendment No 5) (Public Interest Intervention in Judicial Review) 2000, SSI 2000/317.
48 This is rather ironic given the number of occasions on which the existence of this crime has been statutorily
recognised: see Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1995, s 28(l)(a); Criminal Procedure (Scotland) Act 1995,
s 274(2)(c); Crime and Punishment (Scotland) Act 1997, s 48(6); Crime (Sentences) Act 1997, s 2(6)(d);
Sex Offenders Act 1997, Sch 2 para 2(l)(a)(ii); Crime and Disorder Act 1998, s 86; Powers of Criminal
Courts (Sentencing) Act 2000, s 109(6)(d); Sexual Offences (Procedure and Evidence) (Scotland) Act
2002, s 1.
49 2002SCCR57.
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the Reference, the High Court stated that "clandestine injury is a very unusual charge and
cases tend to be exceptional and turn on their own particular circumstances
. . .
[it] is an
offence which may be of an unusual character and may merit an unusual form of disposal,
that is, a non-custodial form".50 The Paton court went on to quash a sentence of two years'
imprisonment and substitute an order for 300 hours community service. The court would
doubtless have found this much more difficult to do had Paton's conviction been for rape
rather than clandestine injury, and it is not difficult to imagine the media outcry which might
have resulted from a judicial statement that community service was an appropriate disposal
where a man had been convicted of rape. As it was, the outcome of Paton's appeal against
sentence appears not to have been reported in any newspaper.'1
Whether or not we choose to attach the label "rape" to a particular act is a decision with
consequences. It affects sentencing decisions52 (although whether it should is another question).
It may make juries more reluctant to convict,53 which may be an argument for adopting a
restrictive definition of the crime, or even abolishing it altogether in favour of a general offence
of sexual assault, as has been done in some other jurisdictions.54 None of these issues, however,
receive any consideration from the court, which would not in any case have been able to take
such radical steps as these factors might suggest. Nor does the court pay any attention to any
of the criticism which has been directed at defining the offence of rape around the lack of
consent of the eomplainer,55 which any serious law reform project would have to consider.
(3) Further aspects which require reform
The requirement of force was not, it might be argued, the only defect in the pre-Reference
law of rape. For example, it remains the case that the crime is limited to penile-vaginal inter-
course. Anything else is not rape, but "merely" indecent assault. A man cannot, under Scots
law, be raped.56 A man who has sexual intercourse with a woman in the belief that she is
consenting is not guilty of rape, however unreasonable that belief may be.5'
Not everyone would agree that these characteristics of the current law could properly be
described as "defects". Each of these propositions will find their defenders somewhere. But
the Reference decision leaves them unaddressed. The case for reform, along with any case for
the defence, has yet to find an audience.
How long will it be, one might speculate, before a trial judge causes controversy by directing
a jury on the "unreasonable belief" rule, leading the Lord Advocate to refer the case to the
High Court so that the decision in jamieson v HM Advocate can be reconsidered?5'* And, it
may be asked, is this an appropriate method of law reform in a mature jurisdiction? The
Reference decision would seem to demonstrate quite clearly that the courts are not well-
equipped to carry out law reform projects.
50 2002 SCCR 57 at 60.
51 This conclusion is based on a search of the UK Newspaper Stories database on Lexis, carried out on 24
June 2002.
52 In Garvock v HM Advocate 1991 SCCR 593, the court held that the fact the Crown could not prove that
the victim had been penetrated with a penis as opposed to a blunt instrument meant that her attacker's
sentence should be reduced from ten years to eight. I doubt very much whether the reasoning employed in
this case is capable of justification.
53 H Kalven and H Zeisel, The American Jury (1966), 250-251.
54 J Temkin, Rape and the Legal Process (1987), 118-119.
55 See V Tadros, "No consent: a historical critique of the actus reus of rape" (1999) 3 EdinLR 317; SexualOffences: The Substantive Law (South African Law Com DP No 85, 1999), para 3.4.7.3 et seq.
56 Although see the peculiar case ofKer (1640), noted by G Mackenzie, The Laws and Custom ofScotland in
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D. CONCLUSION
In a recent article on the unofficial Scottish criminal code project, Lindsay Farmer has argued
that:
the publication of the draft code reflects the emergence of criminal law as an academic subject in
Scotland. It seeks to follow the path marked out by other Anglo-American codification initiatives in
respect of its political ends: wresting the control over law-making from the judiciary
.
.
,59
The choice of alternatives which Farmer presents—academic or judicial control over criminal
law-making—is telling. The more natural assumption—that law-making is the province of
the legislature—seems to find no place. And, indeed, that would appear to be the current
approach of the Scottish Executive, which has shown little interest in issues of substantive
criminal law (at least those which are not already codified in statute). Criminal law reform, it
seems, can be left to the courts. We muddled through before the Parliament's creation. We
may be muddling through for some time yet.
Jarnes Chalmers
Lecturer in Law
University ofAberdeen
(The author is indebted to Peter Duff, Christopher Cane and Fiona Leverickfor their advice.
The usual caveats apply.)
59 L Farmer, "Enigma: decoding the draft criminal code" (2002) 7 SLPQ 68 at 79-80.
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The Progress of Article 1 Protocol 1 in Scotland
A. INTRODUCTION
The last year has seen a growing number of Scottish cases involving Article 1
Protocol 1 of the European Convention on Human Rights,' which provides:
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be
deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by
law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such
laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest to
secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.2
What is striking, although perhaps not surprising, is that it has been pled in cases involving
diverse facts. This, too, has been the experience in England, where the subject-matter of
cases has ranged from the rights of pawnbrokers to the liability of lay rectors for chancel
1 Henceforth "Article 1 Protocol 1".
2 For commentary, see R Clayton and H Tomlinson, The Law ofHuman Rights, vol 1 (2000), 1291-1343; S
Grosz, J Beatson and P Duffy, Human Rights: The 1998 Act and the European Convention (2000), 333-
356; Lord Reed and J Murdoch, Guide to Human Rights Law in Scotland (2001), ch 8; and D Rook,
Property Law and Human Rights (2001), ch 4.
